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Abstract 
The civil wars that have occurred in Africa have had destabilizing effects on the 
political and social structure of African countries .The massacres and genocide of 
1993 and 1994 in Rwanda and Burundi shocked the whole world into 
experiencing the horror of the news that more than one million people had been 
slaughtered in cold blood. The causes of the conflict in Rwanda and Burundi are 
many and complex. In this paper, my major focus will be on the role the armed 
forces have played in the conflict and how demilitarization should be the 
alternative solution in bringing permanent peace to the war torn region. 
I have used a demilitarization model created by African delegates in an effort to 
bring about sustainable peace in the African region. The main components of the 
model include, building consensus, redefining the role of the military, improving 
civil military relations and analyzing the role that external actors have played. 
My findings indicate that the demilitarization process has not been a success in 
both Rwanda and Burundi because despite the signing of numerous peace 
accords the resolutions of the accords have not been fully achieved. The 
demilitarization of rebel groups has been partially implemented. 
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Introduction 
"Peace", admittedly is often a rare commodity in the world, more so in Africa and 
the third world in general. The massacres and genocide of 1993 and 1994 in 
Rwanda and Burundi shocked the whole world into experiencing the horror of the 
news that more than one million people had been slaughtered in cold blood. 
The causes of the conflict in Rwanda and Burundi are many and complex. 
In this paper, my major focus will be on the role armed forces have played in the 
conflict and how demilitarization should be the alternative solution in bringing 
permanent peace to the war torn region. I will also trace and examine the 
sources and causes for the escalation of violence in these countries with special 
attention to the role of the army, its nature and relationship with the people and 
civil government. I shall also examine the barriers to the road to peace. 
The demilitarization process will look at how the military is transformed 
into an institution that is governed by the civilian government, a government 
constituted by the majority of the people. The main concepts that will be 
addressed include the demobilization of the rebel groups and government army, 
the cease-fire agreements, the transformation of the military regimes into civilian 
government and the integration of the army into society. My research is going to 
be a follow up on the demilitarization process that has occurred in Rwanda and 
Burundi. My analysis will be based on the time period starting from1993 to 2003. 
This timeframe will cover the beginning of the genocide, the establishment of 
peace accords and the new transitional governments. I have chosen to focus on 
the demilitarization process because if effectively implemented, it has the 
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potential of bringing regional stability. In my research I will focus on the efforts 
that the government of Burundi and Rwanda have taken towards building 
consensus between opposing groups, redefining the role of the military and 
actions that have been taken to improve civil-military relations. I will also look at 
the role external players have played in the demilitarization process. 
I have chosen to focus on Rwanda and Burundi primarily because its civil 
wars have caused economic and political instability in the entire Great Lake1 
regions. An estimated 1,000,000 people, mainly civilians, have been killed in the 
nine-year civil war that has occurred in Rwanda and Burundi. The year 2003 
stands as a significant point in time because it marks the transitional phase in the 
Burundian and Rwandan governments. The demilitarization process will be 
tested to its fullest as the second phase of the peace accords becomes a reality. 
The success of the transitional power sharing process will determine whether 
demilitarization has been a success or whether it has failed to live up to its goals. 
According to the 2000 "peace accord" signed by the rebels in Burundi, the Tutsi 
President Buyoya stepped down in May 2003 to allow President Domitian 
Ndayizeye to take over. In Rwanda, the peace accord has stated that the present 
transitional government under Kagame will allow for elections to occur in August 
2003. 
Much has been written on the demilitarization process in Rwanda and 
Burundi. However, not much research has been done on the practicality or 
applicability of the demilitarization resolutions that were agreed upon at the 
Arusha Conference. The focus of the Arusha Conference was the need to bring 
1 The Great Lakes constitute of Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Democratic Republic of Congo 
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about sustainable regional stability within Africa. Demilitarization was the main 
focus; the leaders came up with a demilitarization model that would hopefully be 
applicable to the social and political climate that exists in Africa. I shall use this 
model in the analysis and evaluation of my findings. 
My research indicates that the demilitarization process in Rwanda and 
Burundi has been met with challenges. Despite the numerous peace accords that 
have been signed in both countries, the resolutions of the accords have not been 
fully implemented and to date, the demilitarization process has not been 
completely achieved. The demobilization of rebel groups has been partially 
implemented in the above states, because a few dissident groups are still 
operating from neighboring states as guerrillas thus the security issues still 
remain a grave concern for the governments. The civil wars that have occurred in 
Rwanda and Burundi suggest an urgent need to come up with effective and long-
term conflict resolution programs that have the prospects of bringing sustainable 
peace to the war torn nations. 
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A Brief Narrative of the Nature of Conflict in Rwanda and Burundi 
One of the main challenges in conflict resolution is trying to understand the 
nature of the conflict within a country. The actual triggers of violence and hostility 
in Burundi and Rwanda have proven to be complex. In the past the international 
community has focused on ethnic rivalry as the major root cause of conflict. 
Further research has however shown that the conflicts in the region are not just 
ethnic. The root causes can be divided into categories of colonial experience, 
ethnic rivalry and political power. 
Rivalries between the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi were 
present before the colonial period but however were enhanced by the colonial 
experience. The Belgians and Catholic missionaries played a major role in 
enhancing ethnic cleavages within the region. The colonists brought to Burundi 
and Rwanda a cultural bias that elevated the Tutsis at the expense of the Hutus. 
The Europeans favored the Tutsis in education and administration. Following the 
recommendation of Catholic bishops, most Hutu chiefs were replaced by Tutsis 
in the 1930's. The schools were attended by 79% Tutsis and 21 % Hutus. The 
Tutsis began to believe they were racially superior to the Hutus and were more 
intelligent and capable of leadership. 2 
Through a policy of divide and rule, the colonial authorities deliberately 
exacerbated ethnic cleavages. According to Bishop Class, the Tutsis are "born 
to rule and they have a sense of leadership. It is the secret of their settlement in 
the country and of their control over it." The Tutsi also learned from the 
2 Mevin Ndarusigiye, Marie Mayoya: Burundi: When the Pie is Too Small, (National Library: Amman 
Jordon, 2000.) pp.4-5 
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Europeans how to solve their problems by using force. The colonies depended 
on forced labor, so the Tutsi subjected the Hutu peasantry into forced labor and 
took away their land. 3 
In Rwanda, the first Hutu revolution occurred in 1959, when the Hutu 
majority overthrew the ruling Tutsi monarch, killing hundreds of Tutsis and driving 
tens of thousands into exile in neighboring countries. However the tables turned 
in 1990 when Tutsi exiles from the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) who were 
living in Uganda, returned back to claim their rights to actively participate in 
government. The civil war in Rwanda has claimed the lives of roughly 800,000 
Tutsi's. In July 1994, the Tutsi rebels defeated the Hutu regime; causing at least 
2 million Hutu's to flee from their country in fear of Tutsi retribution. Today the 
RPF is the major player in the government. 
The political instability in Burundi started as far back as 1966. King 
Mwambutsa was dethroned by his son Prince Ntare, who was later removed from 
office by a military coup lead by Michel Micombero. Civil unrest continued 
throughout the late 1960's and early 1980's. Increased tension during 1988, 
resulted in violent confrontation between the ruling Tutsi and the majority Hutu's 
(Ndarusigiye 57). The most violent coup occurred in 1991 when Major Pierre 
Buyoya overthrew Colonel Bagaza. Buyoya suspended the constitution and 
dissolved opposition parties. During this period an estimated 300,000 civilians 
were killed. 
3 Mevin Ndarusigiye, Marie Mayoya: Burundi: When the Pie is Too Small, (National Library: Amman 
Jordon, 2000.) 
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The social injustice that existed towards the Hutu initiated the struggle for 
their survival. The Hutu had been largely excluded from political, economical and 
social life. The Tutsis, though they were the minority, occupied more land than 
the majority Hutu's. The exclusion policy that the Tutsi adopted in their 
governance brought great tension between the two groups. The monopolization 
of power in the hands of the Tutsi constituted a crucial and undisputed factor in 
establishing the ethnic cleavage that would later lead to genocide. 
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Chapter 1 : Literature Review 
Demilitarization Process 
The study of demilitarization and its impact seems to be a relatively new 
and relevant topic for political science. The topic of demilitarization is of 
relevance to Africa because the African continent has been characterized by 
military coups in almost two thirds of its states which gained independence after 
colonial rule. Most of the governments in Africa have been established through 
revolutionary methods hence in the beginning governments are often run by 
former rebel leaders who, with time, may go through a transition to establish 
democratic state. 
Most research in this area has been in the form of case studies, which 
have taken a close look at how the demobilization process has been 
implemented in countries such as Mozambique, Angola and South Africa. 
Authors such as Guy Lamb have defined demobilization as a process by which 
the armed forces, both the government and opposition downsize. Lamb's 
research indicates that the demilitarization process is not a static phenomenon. 
The author argues that the process is usually complex and multidimensional and 
in most cases is shaped by historical and social contexts. The author has 
concluded that the process of demilitarization can only be successful when 
certain internal and external factors exist. The internal factors pointed out include 
the political will to envisage and implement demilitarization policies and the public 
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support for such endeavors. The external enabling environment includes the 
existence of good relations between neighboring countries. 4 
The civil wars that have occurred in Rwanda and Burundi have attracted 
considerable attention from the international media and scholars interested in the 
preventative and conflict management areas. The interest in these two countries 
suggest an urgent need to come up with effective and long-term conflict 
resolution programs that understand the root causes of conflict in the Great Lake 
Regions. 
In the past, scholars have felt that little research had been done to indicate 
the impact of demobilization and the risks that are involved in the implementation 
process. Kees Kingma takes a close look at the demobilization process in 
Uganda by focusing on the nature of the conflict concentrating on the key players 
within the Uganda's demilitarization process. The demilitarization of Uganda 
included the demobilization of government and non-governmental troops. The 
reforms included the implementation of programs that catered to the needs of 
armed troops. Ex-soldiers and their families went through pre-discharge 
briefings, which provided them with details on how to establish civilian life by 
teaching them basic skills such as opening bank accounts and giving them legal 
advice. Kigma's argument is that if the veterans are not integrated into the 
society, the possibilities for the armed forces rearming increases. 5 
Some of the lessons learned from the demobilization process in 
Mozambique and Lesotho include the need to have an efficient demobilization 
4 Guy Lamb, "Reflections on Demilitarization: A Southern African Perspective" International 
Peacekeeping. Vol. 7, No3, Autumn 2000. pp. 120-124. 
5 Kees Kingma, Demobilization in the sub Sahara Africa (New York NY: St Martin's Inc 2000) pp. 34-89 
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plan that takes into consideration the timeline that the facilitators give themselves 
between assembling the troops and the initial demobilization time frame. In the 
case of Mozambique the process almost came to a stand still because the troops 
felt that the demobilization process went too slow and they were becoming 
anxious to go back to their normal civilian lives. This case study appears to show 
that the success of the demilitarization process lays in the troops themselves.6 
According to Richard Synge, the demobilization of Mozambique was 
difficult to initiate and hard to sustain because of the lack of trust between the 
Renamo and Frelimo parties. Both parties looked suspiciously towards each 
other and were quick to retreat from their commitment. The author takes a close 
look at the initial stage in the demobilization process. The initial stage was the 
assembly of all the men who had been in the army. The process involved the 
collecting of armaments. However the weapons brought in were generally old 
and in poor conditions. It is estimated that ninety percent of the weapons handed 
in were unserviceable. The author states that the demobilization was half hearted 
because both the warring parties failed to discharge their troops. (Synge 109) 
The demilitarization process in Mozambique had numerous problems. The 
facilitators of the conflict resolution process found it hard to recruit volunteers 
from the new· army because most of the soldiers were suspicious of the 
conditions of co-operation. There were also major problems in the accounting of 
6 Richard Synge, Mozambique UN Peacekeeping in Action 1992-94 (Washington D.C: Institute of Peace 
Press 1997) pp. 100-106 
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the armed forces. This made it difficult for the international agency to come up 
with an appropriate estimate of the cost of ex-combatant integration process.7 
Some of the lessons learned from the demobilization process in 
Mozambique include the need to have an efficient demobilization plan that takes 
into consideration the timeline that the facilitators gave themselves between 
assembling the troops and the initial demobilization. In Mozambique, the 
demilitarization pressure was coming from the soldiers who wanted to demobilize 
before the elections. 
Zimbabwe's demobilization process was a success initially because the 
nature of the cease-fire was spelt out clearly. The freedom fighters were to go 
into assembly points across the country with the intention that some of them 
would be integrated into the main army. However Zimbabwe's case involved an 
effort to reduce the size of the integrated army. The integration of the army 
began soon after independence in 1980. The process involved the provision of 
education for ex-combatants and their families, the provisions of formal 
employment and business ventures such as the formation of the Zimbabwe 
Broadcast Corporation (ZBC) that was established to allow the participation of 
ex-combatants in the economy, seven ex-combatants owned the corporation. 
Though the demobilization process has been successful for the most part in 
Zimbabwe, there has always been a fear among the civilian that the war veterans 
would re-arm themselves. 8 
7 Richard Synge, Mozambique UN Peacekeeping in Action 1992-94 (Washington D.C: Institute of Peace 
Press 1997) pp.109 
8 Moving the People from Conflict to Peace in Eastern and Southern Africa. (EDICESA Harare 1998) pp. 
30-67. 
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Guy Lamb has done a critical review of the demilitarization trends in 
Southern Africa. He has primarily focused on the demobilization process in South 
Africa. The demilitarization process in South Africa has been unique primarily 
because it involved the reform of the police. Lamb argues that reductions in 
military spending and downsizing of the armed forces are not always reliable 
indicators of demilitarization in southern Africa because some of the highly 
militarized countries such as Angola reduced their military spending even during 
their civil wars while a country such as Swaziland, which has not been prone to 
any civil unrest, increased its military spending.9 
Lamb also states that primary function of the demilitarization process 
should be the disarmament of troops. Disarmament can come in the form of a 
dramatic decrease of military spending. It can also involve the reduction in the 
number of military personnel or limitation on arms transfer. He views that 
militarism and militarization provide great insight on demilitarization. These 
definitions provide the conceptual basis for the analysis of the demilitarization 
trends in the Southern African region. The militarism of a state is indicated by the 
way the society validates military power and the preparation of war. He defines 
militarization as the dynamic relationship between military and society; this 
environment encourages military coups and authoritarian regimes. 
9 Guy Lamb, Reflection on Demilitarization: A Southern African Perspective. (International Peace-keeping 
Vol 7 Autumn 2000) 
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Civil-Military Relations 
The literature on civil-military relations will primarily be focused on civil-military 
relations in Africa during government transition. Most analysis on Civil-military 
relations in Africa has been based on a conflict resolution context. Scholars such 
as Robert Griffiths have focused on understanding the armed force not as an 
institution that stands outside its society but as an integral part of society. The 
authors take a close look at military rule and military order by focusing on the 
broader issues that define the relationship between civilians and military. The 
author examines this relationship by focusing on the shifting nature of these 
relations. 10 
Literature studying Civil-Military relations has, in most part, focused on the 
armed forces institutional characteristics and their political role in society. The 
characteristic of the armed force and its interest still is significant in analyzing the 
transitions in civil-military relations. This analysis takes a close look at those 
societies that are coming from authoritarian rule and focuses on some of the 
problems that are associated in institutional reform. Some of the problems faced 
by the governments, who are working towards healthy civil-military relation, 
include making the armed forces more representative towards the ethnicity of the 
country ensuring their political neutrality and bringing the armed forces under 
civilian control. The obstacles and solution to these problems highlight the 
complexity of democratic reform and the demilitarization process. Griffiths has 
seen the beginning of a new pattern in the civil-military relations, which is 
10 Griffiths, Robert I.SOUTH AFRICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN TRANSITION: ISSUES AND 
INFLUENCES, Armed Forces & Society, 0095327X, Spring95, Vol. 21, Issue 3 
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influenced by variables that involve both the armed forces and civil society. The 
variables include the past pattern of civil-military relations, threats to the armed 
forces institutional interest, ethnic fragmentation and the impact of military 
restructuring on reconstruction and development process. The author states that 
the military has both the power and incentive to influence restructuring issues. 
According to the author no military can be apolitical.11 
Conflict Resolution 
Most of the literature on conflict resolution in Africa has been in the form of 
conflict prevention, which generally involves the building of political and social 
structures that help facilitate equal participation of both civilian and military in 
politics. Preventative diplomacy strives whenever possible to avert to costs of 
human suffering that conflict usually causes. 12 
Researchers such as Donald Rothschild have advocated for more military 
transparency, which usually involves making military expenditure be accessible 
to the population and the government. In this context most researchers have 
advocated for laws that oppose international loans to any country that fails to 
carry out a transparent civilian audit of their military spending. Rothschild argues 
that downsizing the military will reduce opportunities for military to engage in 
political manipulation. Rothschild focuses on understanding the armed forces not 
as an institution that stands outside its society but as an integral part of society. 
The author takes a close look at the impact of the military size, structure and its 
11 Griffiths Robert "DEMOCRATISATION AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN NAMIBIA, 
SOUTH AFRICA AND MOZAMBIQUE" Third World Quarterly (Sep 1996)Vol. 17, Issue 3. 
12 William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York, New York: 
Oxford University Press 1985) pp 4-6 
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values upon a society. Donald argues that ethnic conflicts that have occurred in 
Africa are not inevitable and can be managed. He puts more responsibility on 
leaders whom he indicates can prevent harmful relations from arising. He 
advocates that governments should give incentives that channel the rebel 
group's choice along the preferred lines. The parties involved in establishing 
effective conflict management systems in Africa must examine the role of the 
state in defining and negotiating the terms of its relationship with various ethnic 
groups. 13 
Studies done by William Zartman are concerned with local sources of 
conflict in the Third World. The main objective of his studies is to show that such 
conflicts that pose a threat to the international stability, find their origins in the 
political relations of the countries involved and not from external powers such as 
past colonizers. Zartman emphasizes the importance of building up trust between 
the warring parties. He states that parties must be brought to a better 
understanding of the motives behind the peace agreements and what's at stake 
for them if they do not work towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict.14 
Critics who have examined the origins of conflict in Africa, primarily West 
African countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, point out that personalized 
autocratic rule that exists in most of these countries has been the main trigger for 
wars. The irony in most of these countries is that those that challenged the 
regimes through coups did not change the structure of the government thus they 
13 Donald Rothschild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa, (Washington DC: Brooking Institution Press 
2000)pp19-22 . 
14 William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York, New York: 
Oxford University Press) p. 274 
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failed to offer a new alternative that would facilitate for the implementation of 
democracy and the facilitation of peace.15 The above-mentioned researchers 
view conflict resolution as only the beginning and not the end to Africa's 
problems. 
Summary of Literature Review 
The literature reviewed above, indicates that there are some essential tools that 
help facilitate successful demobilization of a country. One essential theme is the 
concept of setting a right time for the demilitarization process to take place. This 
appears essential when determining the success of the conflict resolution 
method. The literature also suggests that those who are involved in the 
demilitarization process should avoid raising expectations beyond realistic levels. 
Knowing the real needs and concerns of ex-combatants beforehand makes the 
design of the program intervention more appropriate. All authors agree that the 
demilitarization process is very expensive and thus there is a need for the parties 
involved to be fully committed to the process. 
The case studies show that demobilization of the armed forces is a slow 
and dangerous process. Results are ambiguous in the beginning of the process. 
One of the common challenges in the demobilization of the armed forces has 
been lack of reliable information about the number of troops that need to be 
demobilized. Another obstacle has been related to the ambiguity of the conflicts. 
This becomes an obstacle because most of the conflict resolution specialists can 
not find the root causes of the conflict. 
15 Rupensighe Civil Wars Civil Peace pp138 
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In summary, demilitarization has been examined from many different 
perspectives but no recent work has examined the progress of the 
demilitarization process in Rwanda and Burundi. No one has questioned the 
necessity of the demilitarization process in these two states. This paper will focus 
on the successes or failures of the demilitarization by examining the process in 
Rwanda and Burundi. 
16 
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework: Arusha Model 
In the analysis of the demilitarization process and the evaluation of my findings, I 
have chosen to apply the demilitarization model designed at the Arusha 
Conference in 1994, "The Leadership Challenges of Demilitarization in Africa 
conference"16 sponsored by the World Bank and the United Nations. I chose this 
particular model firstly because it was created on the bases of past 
demilitarization experiences that have occurred in other parts of the world, 
particularly Latin America. The participants of the conference were able to take a 
comparative look at the demilitarization processes of the past and modify their 
findings to create a demilitarization model that could be applied to the African 
region. Demilitarization was the main focus; the leaders came up with a 
demilitarization model that would hopefully be applicable to the social and 
political climate that exists in Africa. I will use this model for the analysis and 
evaluation of my findings. Secondly, the main architects of this model are from 
Africa. Thus, the model avoids the notion of being western based. It has an 
"African perspective". 17 
The theoretical framework used for the research was created by 
representatives of twenty seven African countries including Rwanda and Burundi. 
The results of the conference highlight demilitarization as a process essential to 
the establishment of a more democratic civil-military relation in Africa. The time 
16 The leadership Challenges of Demilitarization was held in Arusha Tanzania in July 22-24 in 1998. One 
hundred and twenty seven countries gathered to discuss the political, social and economic ramification of 
demilitarization. Countries attending include Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, 
Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Ghana, and Lesotho. 
17 The African perspective implies that the model notes that there are cultural, social and economic 
differences within African conflicts and therefore there is need for adjustments. 
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frame of 1993 -1994 is significant to this research because it gives an insight to 
the root causes and the nature of the conflict in the two countries. The period 
1995-2003 is significant because it marks the road map to peace, which 
highlights the steps that the governments have taken in their demilitarization 
process. These steps include the participation in cease-fires, the demobilization 
and integration of the armed forces and transformation of the military. 
The research method I have chosen is a comparative case study of two 
countries. This method will allow me to make a critical analysis of the 
demilitarization process in the two countries and see if in fact the process has 
been a success or a failure. The model has highlighted that demilitarization is 
essential to the establishment of more democratic governance in Africa. The 
model deserves examination because if it is applied successfully in Burundi and 
Rwanda other countries in the Great Lake regions might follow, but if the model 
fails to yield any positive results then re-evaluation of the demilitarization process 
may need to be made. 
There are several factors that make these two case studies appropriate in 
contributing to the comparative perspective. Firstly, both countries share a 
common ethnic background; Rwanda and Burundi have the same ethnic 
composition with almost the same proportion. Secondly, both countries were 
protectorates of Belgium tor similar length of time. Thirdly, both countries have 
experienced transformation from military regime to civilian rule. The causes of 
the conflict in both countries are similar. The root causes in both countries can be 
characterized by arbitrary colonial boundaries, the disparity in the distribution of 
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national resources, struggle for political power and the ethnic based violence. 
Both countries have gone through tragic civil wars that have contributed to great 
human suffering. Finally, the two countries share a common boarder hence 
instability in either country is most likely to have ripple effects in the other. In both 
cases the cycle of violence has repeated itself within two generations. The 
implementation of the demilitarization strategies involves coming up with 
concrete and practical principles that would lead to sustainable change in the 
civil-military relations in Africa. The framework consists of a sequence of steps 
that countries can follow when implementing the demilitarization process. 
Rwanda and Burundi have undergone similar demilitarization process that 
has yielded different results. Despite the numerous peace accords that have 
been signed in both countries, the demilitarization process has not yet been fully 
implemented. However the results of the model when applied to Burundi and 
Rwanda indicate that there are some concepts that are included in the model that 
are difficult to establish. Building consensus and redefining the role of the military 
has been a challenge since both countries suffer from lack of trust. The parties 
involved were not fully committed to the peace process. They came to the 
negotiating table to give lip service and never implemented the agreements. The 
most successful aspect of the Arusha model has been to illustrate the role that 
external factors have played in facilitating a peaceful transition to the democratic 
process in Burundi. All steps included in Arusha model are essential in 
demilitarization process however the first stage of Building Consensus is the 
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most crucial and essential if there is to be a sustainable and successful 
demilitarization process. 
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Theoretical Framework 
1. Building Consensus 
According to the delegation at the conference it is essential to build a level of 
political consensus between the parties involved. Extensive dialogue must be 
held on the national, sub-regional and regional levels. 
2. Redefine the role of military in society 
The military should be integrated in the society and not be isolated from the 
decision making process in order to ensure the sustainability of the 
demilitarization process. 
3. Improve civil-military relations 
Networking and dialogue between military representatives and civil society 
should be encouraged. Adequate civilian supervision over the military should be 
given. Accountability and transparency measures should be established. A 
Parliament should be established to act as a check and balance to the armed 
forces. The composition of the new-armed force must reflect the ethnic, tribal and 
regional composition of the population. 
4. The role of external actors 
Foreign participants have special roles and responsibility in implementing 
preventative measures. External actors should devote more resources towards 
development and debt reduction programs that are fruitful in creating a positive 
environment for demilitarization. 
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Chapter 3: Building Consensus 
Building consensus is the first and most important step in the 
demilitarization process. This process includes bringing the warring parties to the 
negotiating table and working on a conflict resolution framework that will be 
applied during the demilitarization process. It also gives the parties a platform 
where their grievances and visions of the future can be considered. This stage 
also entails the formulation of a time frame in which the agreed plan will be 
completed. The main objective in the process of building consensus is to make 
sure that all parties involved in the dispute are brought to the negotiating table. 
Accurate identification of all players is important for the success of the 
negotiation stage. The main players should include both articulate elites and the 
less visible members of society. (Table 1, 2.) 
The Arusha model states that during the demilitarization process it is 
essential to build a level of political consensus between the parties involved and 
that extensive dialogue must be held on national and regional levels. Dialogue 
between the warring factions is essential in coming up with appropriate 
mechanisms that will help facilitate the demilitarization process. Outside 
institutions such as the Organization for African Unity (OAU), the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC), the European Union and the United 
Nations could provide appropriate platforms in the demilitarization process. 
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Rwanda 
One of the main challenges that Rwanda faced in its demilitarization process has 
been getting the rebel groups to reach a consensus. The greatest challenge to 
these talks has been the issue of disarmament. In the early stage of the 
demilitarization process, government delegates in both countries initially rejected 
a plan that included the simultaneous disarmament of all combatants. The 
officials felt that disarmament would be disastrous hence they were reluctant to 
cooperate. The building consensus stage was a challenge for Rwanda mainly 
because of the fragmentation of the political system. Getting all the parties 
involved in the conflict to come to the negotiating table has been a challenge 
mostly because the rebel groups and the government have not been willing to 
negotiate. Another obstacle in getting the rebel groups together has been the fact 
that most of the rebel groups that are not participating in the negotiating stage 
are working outside the country as militia groups. 
The first step towards bringing the parties to the negotiating table was held 
in Zaire on March 29th 1991. The main objective of the meeting was to establish 
a cease-fire between the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the government. 
After a month of negotiations the two groups signed the N'se/e Ceasefire 
Agreement. Part of the agreements of the cease-fire was the cessation of all 
hostilities, withdrawal of all foreign troops and the exchange of the prisoners of 
war. However nothing substantial came out of the peace agreement because the 
government failed to implement most of the agreed terms, fighting continued 
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among the two groups anclthis continuation of violence derailed the peace 
process. 18 
Another attempt to bring the warring parties to the negotiation table was 
done in 1992. The cease-fire was held under the facilitation of the Organization 
of African Unity (OAU). The meeting was held in Arusha Tanzania as an effort to 
find a compromise that accommodated the demands of the parties involved. The 
major players in the cease-fire process were the Habyarimana regime and the 
Rwanda Patriotic Force (RPF). The facilitators in the demilitarization process 
included former President Ali Hassan Mwinyi of Tanzania and his Ambassador 
Ami Mpungwe. The negotiation went on for a year before an agreement was 
reached. The main objectives of the cease-fire were the creation of a democratic 
government that upheld the rule of law and the creation of "broad based" 
government of national unity. The parties involved agreed on the creation of a 
national army that would be neutral and be reflective of all ethnic groups that 
exist in Rwanda. Part of the peace agreement was a guarantee that all parties 
would be represented in the legislature. 
Another obstacle in building consensus in Rwanda was the level of 
commitment the warring parties had towards the peace agreement. Both 
Rwandan Patriotic Front and the government showed high level of reluctance in 
implementing any of the agreed upon protocols. The level of leadership played a 
major role in the success and failure of the negotiation stage in Rwanda. In the 
first stage of the negotiation stage President Habyarimana was the main 
18 "The Search for Peace" Embassy of the Republic of Rwanda, Washington D.C 1999-2002 
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obstacle, he vetoed any breakthroughs in the negotiations that gave any 
indications of relinquishing power from MOR (Republic Democratic Movement). 
Parties involved in the Cease-fire: Rwanda 
Table 1: Rwanda Peace Accords, 1993-2002 
Date/Place: March 29, Zaire 1991 
Events & Actors: The signing of the N'sele Ceasefire Agreement. The 
government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwanda Patriotic Front 
(RPF) 
Contents: The government and the rebel groups agreed to the 
demobilization process. Part of the agreement was the cessation of all 
hostilities, withdrawal of all foreign troops and the exchange of prisoner of 
war. 
Date/Place: August 28, 1993 Arusha Tanzania 
Events & Actors: Signing of a Ceasefire, by the Republic Democratic 
Movement (MOR) and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) 
Facilitator: President Ali Hassan Mwinyi and Ambassador Ami Mpungwe. 
Contents: Both parties pledged to promote the security of Rwanda by 
keeping the pledge to suspend their ammunition and weapons to the field. 
The army has to be nationalized and reflective of the ethnic composition of 
the population. 
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Another challenge to the negotiation stage in Rwanda was on the issue of 
the formation of a new national army, which included the integration of the two 
forces to make one army. The rebel group did not trust the government to be 
impartial in their selection of the new army. The agreement defined the mission, 
size and structure of the army as well as the procedures for the assembly and 
integration of the two forces into a National Army. The RPF would have 40% of 
all troops and 50% of all commanding posts. The transitional government would 
rule for a year. Parliamentary elections would be held at the end of the 
transitional period in June 1993. The government position would be equally 
distributed among the major parties.19 
The biggest blow to the negotiation stage in Rwanda was the death of 
President Habyarimana in a plane crash that killed both him and Rwanda's 
president Cyprien Ntaryamira. The two leaders had both been attending the 
regional peace summit in Arusha. The plane crash was the first sign of discontent 
with regards to the peace accords signed. It is believed that the rocket that 
caused the crash was orchestrated by Hutu hardliners who did not like the 
settlement that had been signed with RPF20. The death of the main actor in the 
peace process destabilized the demilitarization process because it enhanced the 
level of mistrust between the warring groups. The death of President 
Habyarimana became a turning point in the ceasefire. The army went on a killing 
spree that left 800,000 people dead. 
19 Mevin Ndarusigiye, Marie Mayoya, When the Pie is Too Small (The National Library : Amman Jordan 
2000) 40-49 
20 Walter Barbara" Peacemaking in Rwanda" The American Political Science Review v.96 (Dec 2002) 
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Burundi 
The first stage of building consensus was more successful in Burundi than in 
Rwanda. However the negotiation stage was not without any challenges of its 
own. Unlike the attitude that the leadership in Rwanda had, the leadership in 
Burundi was more willing to work out an amicable conflict resolution plan that 
would accommodate the rebel groups. 
The death of President Cyprian Ntaryamira did not cause extreme 
violence in Burundi. The reaction to the death was much milder and the country 
went through political instability that involved only sporadic killing from extremist 
groups. Though this instability posed to threaten the co-existence of the different 
factions that existed in Burundi the fighting did not turn out to be genocidal. 
These events clearly illustrate that the Rwandans and Burundians were not ready 
yet for the demilitarization process because the peace accord was signed too 
fast and too early thus the 1992 cease-fire accord became a complete failure.21 
The first sign of discontent with the 1992 peace accords in Burundi was 
shown through the coup that was orchestrated by Tutsi Major Pierra Buyoya in 
1993. The army obviously was not satisfied by the results of the conference 
therefore they decided to take matter into their hands and seize power. This 
incident indicates that military was not willing to take a back seat in the decision 
making process. 
After the failure of the peace accord, Burundi signed another peace 
agreement with the CNDD-FDD (National Council for the Defense of Democracy-
Forces Defense of Democracy) in Rome 1997. These negotiations marked a 
21 Walter Barbara" Peacemaking in Rwanda" The American Political Science Review v.96 (Dec 2002) 
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turning point in the peace process in Burundi because it recognized more parties 
into the peace process. The CNDD became the representative of the Hutu 
fighting forces FRODEBU, PALIPEHUTU, FROLINA. The parties agreed to form 
a constitutional government that would uphold its commitment for a true cease-
fire. In June 1998 the National Assembly signed a document "Agreement on the 
Political Program for the regime of transition". 
In October 2002 the Burundi transitional government under President 
Buyoya and the National Council for Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) 
represented by Pierre Nkurunziza entered into another ceasefire negotiations in 
Arusha Tanzania. The rebels at first rejected all proposals because the leaders 
were opposed to the timeline that had been set aside for them to sign the peace 
accord and stated that "unfortunately we did not reach any understanding despite 
three hours of discussion ... " (Therence Sinunguruza).22 One of the groups that 
was strongly opposed to the ceasefire was the FNL. The head of the facilitation 
team, Deputy President Jacob Zuma met with the delegations of the Palipehutu 
Forces for National Liberation (Palipehutu-FNL) led by Agathon Rwasa. The 
rebel groups would not reach any consensus till the government agreed upon 
terms which included the dismantling of all of its concentration camps, the official 
recognition of the Palipehutu-FNL, the return of the Burundian government 
soldiers to their barracks, the destruction and disarming of all pro-government 
militias and finally the release of all political prisoners. After reviewing the 
22 Burundi's foreign minister "Burundi Ceasefire talks end without progress< www.http.reilefweb> Dec 
2002. 
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requests, the facilitators stopped negotiations with the group.23 Thus in the end, 
the Forces of National Liberation (FNL) refused to sign the accord because they 
felt that their demands were not considered. According to their spokesman Mr 
Habimana, "The ceasefire accord signed by the FDD does not weaken us, 
because we never cooperated with them, and we never depended in any way on 
the FDD,"24. Only three out of the four rebel groups in the end signed the 2002 
peace accord. 
The peace accord gave the rebel groups an opportunity to actively 
participate in the new government. The Arusha agreement between Tutsi 
dominated government and Hutu rebels defined a transitional government that 
divided the governance of Burundi into two phases. According to the plan, the 
two parties would participate in a one and a half year governance period within 
the frameworks of a three-year transitional government. The Tutsi President 
Pierre Buyoya would go first and then step down in May 2003 and allow for 
President Domitian Ndayizeye to rule in the second phase. In May 1st 2003 
President Buyoya stepped down and allowed for a successful transition. 25 
Another meeting to facilitate more talks and to provide an opportunity for 
consensus was held in Switzerland. The meeting resulted in rebel leaders 
signing the "Joint Declaration on the Demilitarization of Kisangani".26 Part of the 
agreement was that the governments of Burundi and Rwanda would work 
towards the demilitarization of the region of Kisangani. Both parties would 
23 "Update on Burundi Ceasefire Negotiations" Burundi Department of Foreign Affairs ( 29 October 2002) 
<http://www.dfa.gov.za> 
24 "Rebels reject Burundi peace deal" BBC News <http://news.bbc.uk >(4 December 2002). 
25 "Country Profile: Burundi" BBC News< http://news.bbc.uk> (5 March 2003) 
26 The meeting was held in Switzerland under the guidance of the United Nations. 
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withdraw their forces that were deployed in and around the area. The rebel 
groups27 agreed not to jeopardize the demilitarization process of the region. 
However this truce was short lived as rebel groups have continued to fight one 
another. 
Parties involved in Cease-fire in Burundi 
Table 2: Burundi Peace Accords, 1993-2002 
Date/Place: August 28, 1993 Arusha Tanzania 
Events & Actors: Signing of a Ceasefire between the government and 
Frodebu, Uprona. 
Facilitator: President Julius Nyerere. 
Contents: Both parties pledged to promote the security of Burundi by 
keeping the pledge to suspend their ammunition and weapons to the field. 
The army has to be nationalized and reflective of the ethnic composition of 
the population. 
Date/Place: Arusha, Tanzania 2002 
Events & Actors: The signing of the Arusha peace accord. The parties involved 
include the CNDD-FDD (National Council for Defense of Democracy- Forces 
Defense of Democracy)28 and the government. 
Facilitator: President Nelson Mandela (South Africa) and Vice President 
Zuma (Tanzania) 
27 Rebel groups include The Front National de Liberation (FNL), Forces pour la Defense de la Democratic 
(FDD). 
28 The CNDD-FDD became the representative of the Hutu fighting forces of FRODEBU, P ALIPEHUTU, 
FRO LINA. 
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Contents: The formation of a transitional government that divided the 
governance of Burundi into two phases. This marked the transition to a 
power-sharing government. 
The leaders at the conference have stated that it is important to establish 
some form of regional and sub-regional solidarity in the demilitarization process. 
Burundi has had regional and sub-regional solidarity through mediators like 
President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and President Nelson Mandela of South 
Africa. Talks brokered by Mandela led to the establishment of a transitional 
power sharing government that was backed by the South African peace-keeping 
forces working under the United Nations. The African Union (AU) peacekeepers 
have been stationed in Burundi as part of AU efforts to end the 9-year-old conflict 
between the Tutsi led army and the Hutu rebel Militias. The building consensus 
stage is a crucial part of the demilitarization process because if the warring 
parties do not agree on a peace agreement that allows for the disarmament and 
reintegration process of former rebel groups the demilitarization process 
becomes a complete failure. The demilitarization process can only be a success 
when the parties involved agree on the rules of engagement that would allow 
them to air their grievances without resorting to violent means. 
Events that have occurred in past indicate that both Rwanda and Burundi 
have failed in the negotiating process and the fragility of the peace accord. 
Consensus has not yet been reached in Burundi; in the past few weeks29 
thousands of people have fled Kanyosha Commune following heavy fighting, 
between government officials and rebels that are loyal to Pierre Buyoya. 
29 "Nine Killed in Kanyosha" <www.allafrica.com> 8 June 2001 
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"Fighting has continued in Burundi despite a largely disregarded ceasefire signed 
in December 2002 by the main Hutu rebel group, the Forces for the Defense of 
Democracy (FOO), and the government."30 • These attacks have been a violation 
of the ceasefire agreement that the rebels signed with the government. The 
attack indicates that the FOO (Forces for the Defense of Democracy) faction is 
not satisfied with the agreements signed. 31 Burundi is paying a large price for 
not having included the FNL rebels groups on the negotiating table. The rebels 
renewed their attack on Bujumbura leaving thousands of people fleeing for their 
lives. The FNL group that was left out of the 2002 peace accord has re-emerged 
causing civil unrest within the country. The FNL wants the new government to 
negotiate with them on their own terms. This incident indicates that when 
consensus is not reached by all parties involved in the conflict, the likelihood of 
the demilitarization failing is high. 
The numerous cease-fires that have been signed are an indication that the 
negotiations are not going well. Though the rebel groups have been able to come 
to the negotiating table they have not been able to live up to the agreements. 
The lack of consensus has led to continued sporadic fighting between rebels and 
government soldiers. One of the reasons behind the inconsistency in the 
consensus has been due to the fact that the rebel groups and the government 
have not bought into the peace process. The initiatives being offered have not 
been good enough to convince them to give up their arms. The armed forces 
30 "Center of Burundi Capital Shelled" BBC News< www.bbc.com > (9 July 2003) 
31 "Civilian Reported Killed in Recent Fight in Eastern Burundi"< www.allafrica.com,> ( 4 April 2003). 
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know what is at stake in giving up their arms and what it means to be in power 
hence the parties all want to be actively involved in the government. 
Conclusion 
Burundi and Rwanda have failed in the first stage of the demilitarization process 
mostly because they have not been able to bring all the parties involved in the 
conflict to the negotiating table. Though Burundi's negotiation stage seems to 
have been more successful due to the success they have had with their 
transitional government. However the Burundian government made the mistake 
of not including the radical FNL party in their power sharing government. Events 
that have occurred on July 2003 indicate that the group has refused to be left out 
of the new government and is demanding that the government negotiates with 
them. 
In the case of Rwanda the negotiation stage has been hindered by the fact 
that not all the rebel groups came to the negotiating table because some of the 
groups are working outside the country as militia groups. They are not willing to 
make a compromise with the government. The main objective of the militia 
groups working in Uganda is to eventually launch a coup that would place them 
in power and oust the Kagame regime. Trying to get the opposition parties to 
build consensus under the political and social condition that exist in Rwanda is 
extremely difficult. Negotiations have taken place under extreme conditions 
mostly because after the 1994 genocide, Rwanda was in complete economic, 
political and social disruption. 
33 
This failure to reach consensus has huge implications on the 
demilitarization process. Without the warring parties agreeing to put their guns 
down and their willingness to work towards more peaceful resolution to the 
conflict, there will always be instability within the country. The failure in the first 
stage has huge implications of the whole demilitarization process because it 
determines the success rate for the rest of the demilitarization process. 
34 
Chapter 4: Redefine the military's role 
The delegates at the Arusha Conference agreed on the fact that the military 
should be integrated into society and not be isolated from the decision making 
process in order to ensure the sustainability of the demilitarization process. The 
delegates stated that if the army does not feel included and is not at ease with 
the changing tides it would likely sabotage the process. 32 
Redefining the role of the military is an essential part of the demilitarization 
process because it marks the transition from the old government to the new. The 
main objectives in the government military reforms that have occurred in Rwanda 
and Burundi have been to establish a governmental structure that allows for 
civilian rule. These reforms have included the re-education of the military, the 
creation a professional army that is apolitical and the institutionalization of civilian 
control over the government. It is important that the military understands the 
importance of their new role within the government and in society. 
Convincing the rebel groups to give up their arms and take a back seat in 
the transition process in the midst of great uncertainty would prove to be difficult 
for the government. The rebel groups have in the past used force and violence 
as a way of getting their message across and also as a defense mechanism 
against other rebel groups. During the civil wars political parties used the army as 
a means of gaining political leverage. In both countries the political parties had 
their own armed forces they used as militia to support their political goals. 
32 www.worldbanks.org" The Leadership Challenges of Demilitarization in Africa Conference" 
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Burundi 
The armed forces have played a crucial role in the establishment of a transitional 
government. There have been active members in the peace accord dictating and 
establishing the terms of engagement of the transitional government. The 
incorporation of most of the rebel groups into the decision making process has 
made the transition to a new national army easier, but not necessarily without 
challenges. The government has taken great care in how they have 
implemented the process of demobilization because of the issues it might trigger 
which compromise security as well as the political and ethnic dimensions. 
Military reforms were introduced in Burundi by the first democratically 
elected President Melchior Ndadaye in 1993. His main objective was to disarm 
the rebel groups; however none of the rebel group was willing to give up their 
arms. Ndadaye's victory was viewed as a threat by the Tutsi army who saw his 
rise in power as an end to their access to influence the economy, security and 
decision making process. Part of the military reform that the President undertook 
was the establishment of a power sharing transitional government that would 
help him implement democratic principles that would eventually facilitate for a 
civilian government. The army was opposed to the democratic transitional 
process, for they felt that Ndadaye was sacrificing his own minority group by 
establishing power sharing government with the Hutu's. The president had to 
convince the army that they had to accept the electoral verdict and not go against 
the will of the people. The protest by the army over the power-sharing process 
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indicates that the army was not ready to give up their political power by allowing 
a civilian government to be created. 
President Ndadaye military reform included establishment of a neutral 
recruitment policy of the army that emphasized communal recruitment in an effort 
to make sure that all ethnic groups and regions would be integrated into the 
army. The establishment of a neutral recruitment policy for the army was 
essential in the creation of an apolitical army. However rebel groups such as 
UPRONA refused integration. Instead they made it difficult for the transitional 
government to govern in an effort to legitimize their coming back in power. In 
October 21 1993, the army staged a coup that killed President Melchior 
Ndadaye, Pontien Karibwami(President of National Assembly), Gilles 
Bimazubute(Vice-President of the National Assembly) Juvenal Ndayikeza 
(Minister of Territory Administration), Richard Ndikumwani (Security Chief of 
Staff), Mrs Eusebia Ntibantunganya (spouse of the former foreign minister) and 
four provincial governors. For the army, this was a clear attempt to end 
democracy and bring back a dictatorship. These events later led to the 
systematic killings of the Hutus by the army.33 These events clearly show that the 
army was not yet ready to take a back seat in the decision making process. Any 
change in the army and government structure meant the effective end of their 
political and economic power. The numerous coups that have occurred after the 
death of the first democratically elected President indicate that the armed forces 
33 Mevin Ndarusigiye, Marie Mayoya, When the Pie is Too Small (The National Library : Amman Jordan 
2000) p.51-58 
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in Burundi might be having a hard time accepting a minor role in the decision 
making process. 
Under the current government of Buyoya since 1998-2003, the military still 
has an upper hand in government decision-making. The President himself was a 
former solider and still has close ties with the army commanders. The reason 
why there has been continued fighting amidst peace talks is because the rebel 
groups want equal representation in the new government. One of the main 
concerns of the rebel's was that "sharing political power ... would be meaningless 
while the army still was dominated by Tutsis." 34 The rebels have been calling for 
a new army that is reflective of the ethnic diversity that exists in Burundi. 
President Buyoya, under pressure from the international community, has 
tried to apply democratic principles to his government. The first concern that he 
has addressed has been the reintegration of the army. The old army was 
dismantled and a new army was created. The new army was made out of fifty 
percent government officials and fifty percent Hutu rebels. Equal representation 
has allowed for the creation of an army that is neutral in its ethnic composition. A 
FAR commander heads the National Army while a RPA commander heads the 
gendarmerie. The army reform has also lead to the establishment of joint 
command in the army between the two commanders of the FDD and FNL. The 
joint command in the army has allowed for a peaceful transition of the armed 
forces. 
34 "Rebels reject Burundi Peace Deal" BBC News www.bbc.com (4 December 2002.) 
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Rwanda 
In Rwanda, military reform effort began during the cease-fire process. The 
government agreed to integrate the rebel forces into the new national army. The 
RPF would have a ratio of 40% of all troops and 50% of all commanding posts. 
The government of Rwanda has taken great strides in the demobilization process 
by creating the Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) to 
implement the first stages of the demilitarization process. In 1996 Rwanda 
began the demobilization process by incorporating approximately 15,000 ex-FAR 
of the estimated 40,000 who returned to Rwanda from the Refugee camps into 
the new army and by September of 1997 an estimated 8, 700 soldiers were 
demobilized from the RP A. 35 
The government has currently reduced the army's size to 13,000 troops and 
gendarmerie of 6,000 men. The government under Kagame has asked for 
outside help to facilitate the reintegration process. The government requested 
that a neutral international force be in charge. The UN Security Council approved 
the deployment of 5,500 U.N Blue Helmets to provide security in the demilitarized 
zones. However the first stage of the reintegration process was poorly 
implemented because the government was not able to effectively reduce the 
number of the APA troops they incorporated into the new army. Rwanda's 
involvement also made the first successful effort in redefining the role of the 
military because of its involvement in the DRC civil war. Donors became more 
reluctant to finance the demilitarization process. 36 
35< www.reliefweb.int> "Rwanda demobilization and reintegration project" January 25 2002. 
36< www.reliefweb.int> "Rwanda demobilization and reintegration project" January 25 2002. 
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The international community has played a major role in the demilitarization 
process of both countries. The World Bank has offered its expertise and financial 
support. The World Bank has established a Demilitarization and Reintegration 
program. The World Bank was involved in the second stage of the reintegration 
process. The main focus of the program was to help Rwanda in the social and 
economic reintegration of its ex-combatants. The plan included the 
demobilization of 20,000 RPA soldiers and the demobilization of an estimated 
30,000 members of the armed forces returning for the DRC. The ex-combatants 
that were demobilized in the first stage were also included in the second stage. 
The World Bank played an important role in the demobilization process in 
Rwanda because it brought with it a structured organization with well designed 
goals that divided the demobilization and reintegration process into three phases 
that would be implemented within a period of 12-18 months starting February 
2002. The process included the transportation of the ex-combatants to 
demobilization centers, the provision of RDRP identity card, medical screening 
(HIV/AIDS counseling) and the orientation about civilian life and making the ex-
combatants aware of the benefits available to them. The next stage of the 
demobilization stage was the establishment of the Reinsertion program that 
provided a transitional safety net (TSN). The purpose of the program was to 
provide the ex-combatants with their basic needs such as rent, medical care and 
food. The demobilization of Child Ex-Combatants involved the reunification of 
families and the provision of trauma counseling and psychosocial care. Though 
the demilitarization program was well structured, the government of Rwanda has 
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struggled to make this process work. Continuous fighting and lack of trust among 
the soldiers has made the redefinition of the military's role difficult. Most of the 
ex-combatants who are being integrated into the new national army are not sure 
that the members of the ruling government will not retaliate against them or over 
look their role in the new government. 37 
Some progress has been made in the creation of an apolitical army. The 
government of Rwanda has made sure that all ethnic groups are included in the 
new national army removing the ethnic monopoly that had dominated the army 
for many years. The coups that have occurred in the past have been an 
indication that the military and the rebel groups have been accustomed to 
participating in the decision-making policy. 
Progress has been made in Rwanda in their effort to reeducate the ex-
combatants. The government has established military-reeducation centers that 
provide a range of programs, which include topics on human rights, and the 
discussion of the new rules of engagements. Gako military base, which houses 
Rwanda's former government army, offers a reeducation program. The program 
has 2,000 officers and soldiers who will be integrated into the national army. The 
main theme that the base is emphasizing is the new mission of the national army 
whose primarily role will be to serve the country and its citizens at all times. The 
re-doctrination of the army is essential for the transitional process to succeed and 
according to Munyambo, "we try and teach then by showing them our behavior, 
our military discipline, our military line."38 The Gako military base has been 
37 "Rwanda: Demobilization and Reintegration Project" http://web.worldbank.org 4, November 2002. 
38 Block Robert, "A delicate merger of warring armies". (World Press Review. March 1995 v 42) 
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created by the government in an effort to establish a new doctrine within the 
army that allows for the loyalty of the army to be towards the government and the 
citizens of Rwanda. 
Rwanda's effort to include former army leaders into parliament has not been 
successful because some of the ministers have defected. Recent events indicate 
that Brigadier General Emmanuel Habyarimana who was defense minister and 
Lieutenant Colonel Balthazar Ndengenyika who was the army representative in 
parliament were caught at the border of Uganda while heading to join rebel 
groups .The two officials are accused of working with the Ugandan security 
operatives in an effort to destabilize the country. 39 These events indicate that the 
road to peace is still long. 
Conclusion 
The neutrality of the army is highly questionable in both Rwanda and 
Burundi mostly because the two countries are both being run by former rebel 
leaders who have close links to the army. The redefining of the role of the military 
is important because it would allow for the creation of an apolitical army whose 
main role is to protect the country and the citizens. Government reforms 
implemented by both countries have been essential in the transformation process 
of the military regimes as they work towards establishing a civilian government. 
39 "Rwandan EX-Minster defects" BBC News, 1April2003. 
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Chapter 5: Improve civil-military relations 
One of the main points reinforced at the Conference was that networking and 
dialogue between military representatives and civil society should be 
encouraged. Adequate civilian supervision over the military should be given. The 
demilitarization model states that Parliament must be given the capacity to 
monitor and evaluate the function of the armed forces. There is need to create an 
institutional format that allow for a civilian government to rule without 
interruptions from the army. 
The first challenge that the governments of Rwanda and Burundi have 
faced in their effort to build healthy civil-military relations has been the issue of 
trust. The civil wars and the legacy of genocide that has occurred within the 
countries have left the civilian population scared. The wounds that exist between 
the civilian and the armed forces are deep rooted; hence building a healthy civil-
military relationship becomes an essential part of the demilitarization process. 
The numerous cease-fires and failed peace accords have come at a high 
price for the civilian population. The civilian are the ones who were raped, 
brutally murdered and forced to move out of their homes and become refugees in 
neighboring countries. All of this suffering was done by the hands of the army; 
hence there is need for the army to convince the civilians that they have changed 
and that they can be trusted. 
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Burundi 
Part of the demobilization process that has occurred in Burundi includes the 
reintegration of the army into society. The social integration of the military was 
encouraged as a way of reconciling ex-combatants and the civilian population. 
The first step that the government has taken towards this goal has been the 
sensitization of the army towards the needs of the population and also redefining 
their role in the new political system. In Burundi, establishing a healthy civil-
military relationship was less complicated because the wounds of mistrust and 
betrayal were less complicated. 
The civil wars that have occurred in Burundi in the past nine years have 
created a great rift in the civil-military relations. The armed forces have played a 
major role in the instability ph_ase because their coups have created 
environments of insecurity that has left almost three hundred thousand civilians 
dead. The civilian population has a negative view of the military because of the 
psychology of militarism that they have been subjected to. Most citizens feel a 
sense of insecurity. 40 
The first step towards improved relations was when the Burundian 
government and the rebel groups signed the cease-fire accord in 1993. The 
accord facilitated for the demilitarization of the armed forces and marked the 
beginning of a peaceful resolution to the conflict that had claimed thousands of 
civilian lives. 
40 Reni Lemorchand, Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1996).pp 34-56 
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Under the initiatives created by government programs that are focusing 
on the reintegration of the army in society, the new Burundian army has been 
working toward restoring trust among the civilian population. Recently the 
Burundi army returned loot that had been stolen from Bujumbura by an army 
battalion. The head of the battalion in which the group of looters came, assured 
the public that investigation was underway to bring the culprits to justice. The 
move was received with mixed feelings from people of Kamenge. Some civilians 
felt that this incident helped restore some form of trust, while other saw it as an 
example why the army should not be trusted. 41 Another step towards improving 
civil-military relations was the passing of the Genocide Law by parliament in 
2002. The draft provides a grievance process for former victims and an 
international judiciary that would look into inquires of crimes committed during the 
genocide in Burundi. 
The effort of re-establishing a healthy civil-military relation was facilitated 
by the first democratic president Melchoir Ndadaye in 1993. However, his vision 
of establishing a democratic government was sabotaged by the paratroopers, 
who where instrumental in the killings of the President and half of his cabinet. 
One mistake that Ndadaye made was to establish a multi-party system without 
reforming the army first. During his term the army was 100% Tutsi. Another blow 
to civil-military relations was by the death of President Habyarinman(Rwanda) 
and President Cyprian Ntaryamira(Burundi) who were killed in a plane crash that 
41 Prime Nidikumagengue, "Burundi army returns loot" BBC News <http://news.bbc.uk.> (14 January 
2003.) 
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occurred in October 16, 1993 . The relationship was strained because the two 
incidents sparked ethnic violence that led to the genocide of Tutsi's in 1994. 
Civil-military relations have improved in Burundi even amidst sporadic 
fighting. The interim government has been able to maintain a peaceful 
transitional process. On May 1st 2003, President Buyoya was able to step down 
from his position without causing significant instability. The absence of a coup 
attempt reflects well on the transitional government in Burundi. This could mark a 
turning point in the demilitarization process because it indicates the potential of a 
sustainable demilitarization process. 
Rwanda 
The process of improving civil-military relations has been difficult because 
the remnants of the genocide that killed 800,000 people are still imminent in the 
society. The genocide destroyed the social and cultural structure of Rwanda. 
The gap between the civilians and the military is much wider in Rwanda because 
of the genocide. The road to recovery seems far-fetched for most of the civilian 
who are still waiting for the people who tortured them to go on trail. For most of 
the citizens the question of improving civil-military relations has nothing to do with 
accepting the ex-combatants back into their society, their main concern is 
whether justice will be served. 
Part of the healing process in civil-military relations of Rwanda has been the 
bringing of former army members and rebel group leaders to justice. The 
government has set up a national community courts that will try at least 100,000 
suspects. The establishment of community courts (Gacaca) has been a positive 
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step the government has taken towards acknowledging that civilians where the 
main victims in the civil wars. This process will help strengthen national unity. 
However the process has been slow and much criticism has been given by 
Human Right organizations in regards to the Gacaca courts because the courts 
are equipped with judges who do not have any legal training.42 The President 
however is optimistic about the importance of the courts in the establishment of 
peace relations within society. He has stated that the success of the courts will 
depend primarily on the participation of the people "reconciliatory justice will be 
the basis for unity and the foundation for progress" (Kagame)43. The army 
members have agreed to this process mostly because it gives them a lesser 
sentence than they would normally get if tried in a regular court. In the Gacaca 
courts the most they would get for their crimes is community service. The 
acceptance of the Gacaca courts might be an indication of a new willingness on 
the military to accept civilian control. 
The nature of the courts themselves have been set in such a way that the 
public actively participates in the justice process by giving testimonies and being 
given a chance to forgive those who committed crimes against them. The 
government hopes that the public confessions will help in the healing process as 
victims attempt to discover the fate of their missing relatives. However the 
reconciliation process is not fully accepted by all members in society because 
some still feel that by letting the criminals go on a lesser charge justice will not 
have been done. The ex-combatants also fear reprisal from the community. The 
42 David Bamford. "Rwanda sets up genocide courts" BBC News 25 November 2002. 
43 "Rwanda launches village courts" BBC New 18 June 2002. 
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only draw back of the Gacaca courts is that they do not give any form of 
protections for the witnesses and the detainees who testify in public. There is no 
guarantee whether the public after the confession will not take matters into their 
own hands and retaliate against the former prisoner. The government has also 
been accused of setting a double standard in their tribunals because they have 
been reluctant to bring many of its own people to justice. There is need for 
members of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (APA) who committed crimes to be 
brought to court. Instead the government has insisted that the tribunal should 
only try genocide cases.44 The Gacaca courts are part of the peace and 
reconciliation process facilitated by the government. The courts contribute to the 
demilitarization process because the key concepts of the reconciliation process 
contribute to the improvement of healthy civil-military relations. 
Despite the government's reluctance in giving up their own members to the 
tribunal, some top officials have been brought to trail. The recent arrest of the 
man who headed the Rwandan armed forces during the genocide, Augustin 
Bizimungu, has been welcomed by the citizens. Augustin Bizimungu has been 
sent to the International Criminal court in Tanzania Arusha were he awaits trail. 
The bringing to trial of top government officials during the demilitarization process 
indicates a reform process within the government and military. There no longer is 
immunity for military officials. 
Some progress has been made to re-educate ex-combatant before sending 
them back to their communities. The establishment of a multi-party system has 
44 "Rwanda: Deliver Justice for Victims of Both sides"< www.hrw.org> August 12 2002. 
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provided the population the right to be affiliated with any political party. However 
the government has still retained an upper hand on most of its opposition parties. 
On June 23rd, the National Assembly adopted an organic law that prohibits 
political parties to be affiliated to one ethnic group, tribe, clan, region and religion. 
Political parties are supposed to reflect the unity of the Rwandan people45 • This 
new amendment has received great support from the civilians. The population 
came out in large amounts to make their opinion known; the new constitution was 
passed by 93% of voting electorate46• The constitution is designed to prevent 
genocide. The framework of the new referendum safeguards against the 
dominance of a single political party and bans the enticement of ethnic hatred. 
The outpour for the elections indicates that "the constitution has been prepared 
by Rwandans themselves" (Karangwa). The new constitution stipulates that no 
party can hold more than 50% of seats in cabinet even if they secure an absolute 
majority in parliamentary.47 The new laws provides that the President, the Prime 
minister and President of the lower house cannot all belong to the same party 
and includes a new provision outlawing the incitement of ethnic hatred. This 
balance of power helps protect the civilians from ethnic monopoly that has 
existed within the party system. However the recent governmental crack down on 
political parties just before the August elections has led the human right 
organizations to suspect that the current government is intimidating any potential 
45 
"Rwanda assembly bans ethnic parties before polls" Reuters 27 June 2003. 
46 
"New Era Looms in Rwanda" BBC News Tuesday 27 May 2003. 
47 
"New Era Looms in Rwanda." BBC News Tuesday 27 May 2003. 
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rivalry. Rwanda prepares to hold it first elections in August 2003. This will be the 
first election held since the 1994 genocide that killed 800,000 people.48 
The constitution of Rwanda has been amended to reflect the new goal of 
"national unity''. The constitution had made a clear statement that the rule of law 
and civilian life shall be at the heart of the nation. The first article in the 
constitution stipulates that Rwanda shall be a democratic state that will be 
governed for the people and by the people. Power has been transferred from the 
military to the civilian government, article 6 in the constitution stipulates that all 
powers shall come from the state and the national sovereignty shall belong to the 
people of Rwanda. Article 12 stipulates that public liberty and human life shall be 
inviolable no one may be prosecuted arrested. All citizens are equal and shall not 
be discriminated against. Finally the constitution has given the executive powers 
to the President of the Republic and he shall be assisted by the government, 
composed of the prime minister and minister of state. The constitution reflects a 
positive civil-military relation that places the civilian government above the 
military. 
Conclusion 
Much progress has been made by both Rwanda and Burundi in their effort 
to improve the civil-military relationship. The governments have been able to 
identify the negative image the society has towards the military. The government 
reforms that have included the re-education programs in Rwanda have been 
instrumental in the rehabilitation process of the ex-combatants. In Burundi the 
48 "RPF seeks to eliminate opposition" (New York, May 8, 2003) <http://hrw.org/press.eom> 
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successful implementation of the transitional government helped stabilize the 
country and thus creating an environment conducive for reconciliation between 
the military and civilian population. Though the governments have done their best 
to implement reforms that reflect their commitment towards healthy civil-military 
relationship the sporadic killings and the insecurity still present within these 
countries takes the process of improving civil-military relations a step backwards. 
The success of the Improve civil-military relations stage in the demilitarization 
process is essential because it creates an atmosphere of cooperation between 
the two groups. The success of the reintegration process of the army into society 
heavily depends of the relationship that exists between the army and the civilian 
population. 
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Chapter 6: The role of external actors 
The delegates at the Arusha Conference maintain that foreign participants have 
a special role in helping to maintain stability during the demilitarization process. 
External actors should devote more resources towards development and debt 
reduction programs that are fruitful in creating a positive environment for 
demilitarization process. 
Much criticism has been directed towards the lack of interest that the 
international community has demonstrated towards the civil wars in Africa. The 
United Nations has received most of the criticism because of its ineffectiveness 
in both Rwanda and Burundi during the genocide period of 1994. As stated by 
the delegates at the Arusha Conference the role of the international community 
cannot be over looked in the conflict resolution process because they bring with 
them mediation expertise and financial resources that are essential to the 
success of the demilitarization process. External actors have been present in 
Burundi and Rwanda during the pre-genocidal stage (1993) and the post 
genocide phase (1994-2003) of the conflict. The external organizations that have 
participated in the peace process have included the United Nations, Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGO's) and religious affiliated organizations. All of 
these groups have contributed either in the mediation and implementation stage 
or have been active in providing humanitarian assistance. 
Regional leaders have played a very important role as mediators between 
the rebels and the government. Their role has been crucial because most of the 
facilitators have been highly respectable and influential leaders in the African 
52 
community. The local actors who participated in the negotiation stage and the 
implementation stage brought to the table regional expertise crucial in facilitating 
dialogue. The first Arusha conference that occurred in 1992-1993 was held in 
Tanzania through the initiative of the then President Ali Hassan Mwinyi. Other 
regional leaders that have participated in the peace process have been former 
South African President Nelson Mandela whose intensive efforts led to the 
signing of a Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in Arusha. Another regional 
actor that has played an active role in the negotiation stages ( 1996-1998) was 
the former president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere. 
External actors have been the driving forces behind secret talks that have 
been held in Switzerland and Tanzania between rebel groups. The presence of 
external help has been instrumental in the facilitation of a peaceful transition of 
power. The international community has also brought with it resources that have 
been influential in the demilitarization process, such as the World Bank which 
has funded most of the demobilization and integration programs in Rwanda and 
Burundi. 
Burundi 
In the case of Burundi, the role of external actors has been essential in the 
establishment of neutrality in the region. External actors have managed to 
establish preventive methods that have helped in the demilitarization process 
such as the presence of the UN special representative Quid -Abdallah in Burundi 
helped maintain stability in the shadow of genocide. The UN's role during this 
time period was to "warn the Burundian leaders of the possibility of an explosion 
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like that in Rwanda ... needed to give them hope by convincing them that a 
political settlement was possible"49 
The Organization of African Union (OAU) has been an active participant in 
Burundi. The OAU sent its representative Ambassador Papa Louis Fall of 
Senegal to negotiate with the government of Burundi on the issue of placing 500 
African soldiers in place before the end of December 1993. However because of 
protest by the Tutsi's who opposed the idea of sending uniformed men into the 
region, the OAU ended up sending military observers who where civilians. The 
OAU, however, was unable to deploy the seventy observers in the agreed 
timeframe. In the end only eighteen observers out of the seventy requested were 
dispatched by February 1994. The OAU mission group was however expanded 
to twelve civilians and seventy military officers by 1995 and its new head became 
Leandra Bassole of Burkina Faso. 50 
The United Nations also played an important role. Its main mission in 
Burundi was to restore the democratic institutions that had broken down after the 
death of President Ndadaye. The U.N wanted to facilitate dialogue between the 
opposing parties and work closely with Organization of African Union (OAU). In 
1993 the UN sent Quid Adallah as its special representative to Burundi. The UN 
special representative worked closely with local leaders and the OAU in an effort 
to exchange vital information that allowed the U.N to facilitate dialogue between 
the parties. The presence of the UN representative helped stabilize a conflict that 
49 Ould-Abdallah, Burundi on the Brink 1993-95 (Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press 
2000. pp. 60-64 
50 Ould-Abdallah, Burundi on the Brink 1993-95 (Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press 
2000. 
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could have easily escalated into genocide. The United Nations has been the 
main facilitator in most of the peace accords that have been signed. During the 
1994 cease-fire process a neutral international force (U.N Blue Helmet) was sent 
to the demilitarization zones in Burundi to help implement security measures. 
Rwanda 
Following the signing of the Arusha agreement in 1993 between the 
Rwandan government and the RPA, the U.N established a peacekeeping task 
force known as UN Mission to Rwanda (UNMAIR). The main function of the 
UNMAIR was to observe the cease-fire process and the implementation of the 
agreements. However the UNMAIR was unable to monitor all the development 
that led to the genocide. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
was responsible for hosting the round table conference that discussed the 
rehabilitation of the area affected by the warring in April 1994.The UN has also 
been active in the tribunal courts that have been established to try genocide 
crime. The current head of the UN war tribunals is chief prosecutor Carla del 
Ponte.51 The United Nations (U.N) under the leadership of Boutros-Ghali has 
been criticized for not playing a decisive role during the genocidal period the 
occurred in Rwanda. However its role after the genocide until the present has 
been essential in stabilizing the political situation in the two countries. The OAU 
was also present in the conflict resolution process in Rwanda, the organization 
was actively involved in the peace-making settlements in Rwanda that led to the 
Arusha Agreement in 1993. 
51 "Army chief faces genocide charges" BBC News , Thursday August 15 2002 
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The huge influx of refugees returning home has called for the urgent need 
for humanitarian agencies to participate in the peace process. Non-governmental 
organizations have played an essential role in the demilitarization process by 
providing humanitarian assistance that has been essential in the stabilization 
period. Humanitarian aid is important in the demilitarization process because it 
helps take care of the immediate needs of the ex-combatants and the civilian 
population. 52 
Individual Governments contribution to the demilitarization process 
Individual governments have played an important role in the 
demilitarization process by providing Burundi and Rwanda with enough monetary 
funds to implement the demilitarization process. The French government, prior to 
the genocide, had given support to the Rwandese government and army. French 
intervention was greatly welcomed by the interim government in Rwanda but 
highly opposed by the rebel groups who saw the French as being biased towards 
the government. In 1994 due to public pressure the French government sent in 
2,200 soldiers to Goma and Bukava in Zaire. The French assisted the RAF by 
training their army. Though the troops came late, they where able to save an 
estimated of 12-15000 Tutsi's and helped to provide food relief to the refugees. 
The French finally left in August and their mission was replaced by UN Ethiopian 
troops. 53 
52 "Hutu refugee returning home in large numbers" 16 February 1996. 
<http://www-cgi.cnn.com/WORLD/9602/rwanda_refugees/> 
53 The European Union's Political and Development Response to Rwanda. 
<http://www.oneworld.org/ecdpm/pubs/dp27 _gb.htm> 
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One of the main actors in the demilitarization process has been the 
Belgium government because of its close ties with Rwanda and Burundi. The 
Belgium government has donated one million (US) dollars in the past year to 
both governments. The Belgians played a major role during the Arusha process 
they sent troops to UNAMIR. However their effort to help was disrupted when 1 o 
Belgian soldiers where massacred in Burundi, due to public outcry the Belgians 
had to withdraw their troops. 54 
The United States, during the first stage of the peace process was 
reluctant to send any troops into Rwanda because of its prior experience in 
Somalia. Hence they did not support the resolution that was being pushed by the 
French to send troops to Rwanda. However, in recent years because of public 
criticism towards the government's reaction to the crisis in Africa more initiatives 
have been made. President Clinton endorsed the UN Mission to Rwanda 
(UNAMIR). The UN "blue helmet" arrived in Rwanda later in October of 1993 with 
troops from Belgium, Canada, Ghana, Bangladesh and Tunisia. Rebel forces 
insisted that the French troops should not be part of the troops because in the 
past there have not been seen as a neutral force, but were viewed as having 
sided with the government of Rwanda. 55 
The European Union has played an active role in the conflict resolution 
process in Burundi and Rwanda. The signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement in 
August 2000 brought a new era of cooperation between Burundi and the donor 
54 The European Union's Political and Development Response to Rwanda. 
http://www.oneworld.org/ecdpm/pubs/dp27 gb.htm 
55 Ould-Abdallah, Burundi on the Brink 1993-95 (Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press 
2000.) 
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community in Europe. At the conference at the Paris Don conference in 
December 2000, mostly the European Commission (EC) and EU member states 
pledged 40 million. The European Union decided on March 4th 2003 to contribute 
to the establishment of an African Union cease-fire observer's mission in 
Burundi. The grant is estimated to be 1.23 million (Euro)56. The mission will 
monitor the implementation of the cease-fire agreement signed in December 
2002 between the government and the rebel groups. The European Union has 
also set up the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and 
rehabilitation programme (PREBU) in Rwanda and has pledged 15 million 
towards humanitarian aid programmes that would benefit 2 million people. 57 
The International community has played a crucial role in the 
demilitarization and conflict resolution process in Burundi and Rwanda. They 
have been able to make a strong statement of their vision of establishing 
democratic principles in Burundi and Rwanda. The external actors have also 
been able to contribute financially towards the demilitarization process. The 
demilitarization process has so far been a costly process; millions of dollars have 
been spent in the humanitarian and social integration programs. 
Conclusion 
The presence of the international community in the above countries has had 
mixed blessings. It is clear that the international community was caught off guard 
when the genocide of 1994 occurred in Burundi and Rwanda. None of the 
56 European Union to assist African Union in launching a ceasefire observer mission in Burundi 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/ip03_308.htm> 
57 The European Union Development Response to Rwanda 
<http://www.oneworld.org/ecdpm/pubs/dp27 _gb.htm> 
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organizations understood the depth and disruptive nature of the conflict; hence 
they were not able to prevent the genocide. The role and the credibility of the 
United Nations was shaken because of its inactivity in Rwanda. Though the "blue 
helmets" were deployed earlier they had no infrastructure in the country to 
sustain the force deployed, hence their presence in the two countries became a 
token. Another mistake that the United Nations made in their role in Rwanda and 
Burundi was that they played an impartial role to the extent that they did not 
criticize the interim government in an effort not to destabilize the fragile peace 
process. The rebel groups saw this move as a sign that the UN was down player 
the fact that the massacres that had occurred in Rwanda was done in the hands 
of the government. 
Later the international community tried to over compensate for their 
inactivity in Rwanda by sending too many organizations to Burundi. An estimated 
eighty NGO's were operating in Burundi in 1994. Most of them did not seem to 
have a clear vision of the nature of the conflict and what was required to help. 
The NGO's are also criticized for bringing a "dogmatic and academic approach to 
the crisis."58 Most of the organization failed to realize that the nature of the 
conflict required a different approach than they had used in conflict resolution. 
The process of demilitarization has proven to be expensive and long and 
requires full commitment from all parties involved. The international community 
and the participating NGO's in Rwanda in the beginning of the conflict in Burundi 
and Rwanda did not fully commit themselves. As soon as the conflict in Rwanda 
58 Ould-Abdallah, Burundi on the Brink 1993-95 (Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press 
2000.) 32-37 
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escalated in 1994 the international community pulled out leaving the civilians 
under the mercy of the brutal armed forces. The United Nations pulled out its 
staff in 1999 after two of its senior official were murdered by Hutu extremist in 
Burundi, because of this incident all operation were suspended. The Belgium 
government also pulled out after three of its personal where killed. 
Though the international community has had mixed results their role cannot 
be over looked in the overall picture of conflict resolution in Burundi and Rwanda. 
The international community has learned from its mistakes and has made 
necessary adjustment to make their presence in the two regions be as effective 
as possible. They are now working in collaboration with the government in order 
to better serve the communities that they are working in. The financial resources 
that the international agencies bring will help establish sustainable development 
that will enhance the stability of Burundi and Rwanda. 
60 
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
My evaluation of the success and failure of the demilitarization process will 
be based on how successfully Rwanda and Burundi implemented the first and 
crucial stage in the demilitarization process, which is the stage that involves 
building consensus between the warring parties. I will also analyze whether the 
main interests of the parties were addressed, the obstacles encountered and 
factors that led to progress, alternatives and missed opportunities and lessons 
which could be learned, from the process. 
My research indicates that the demilitarization process in Rwanda and 
Burundi has been met with challenges. Despite the numerous peace accords that 
have been signed in both countries, the resolutions of the accords have not been 
implemented in full and to date the demilitarization process has not been fully 
achieved. The demobilization of the militant groups has been partially 
implemented in the above states although dissident groups are still operating 
from neighboring states as guerrillas. Security issues still remain a grave 
concern for the governments. 
One of the main objectives of the Arusha model was to formulate a 
demilitarization process that would help implement a sustainable conflict 
resolution model that would bring about stability and peace in Africa. The results 
of the model indicate that peace and stability have not yet been fully achieved in 
both countries; security still remains of grave concern in both countries. 
Burundi and Rwanda failed to successfully implement the first stage of the 
demilitarization process. The stage includes the negotiations that allowed for the 
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opposing groups to reach some form of consensus that both parties can agree 
on. Both countries have struggled in the first stage of the demilitarization process 
of building consensus. The lack of trust among the rebel groups has been the 
biggest obstacle in the building consensus stage. 
In the case of Rwanda both the government and the rebel groups did not 
trust each other enough to accept the terms of the peace accords signed. They 
came to the negotiating table to give lip service and never appeared to truly 
support the agreements. President Habyarimana vetoed any breakthroughs, 
indicating he was not willing to compromise. Lack of commitment towards 
building consensus was also reflected in Burundi. President Buyoya only came 
to the negotiating table because of international pressure that had imposed 
sanctions on his government. These two incidents indicate that the first stage in 
the demilitarization process lacked the essential ingredient that would determine 
the success of the talks. The lack of commitment in the first initial stage to bring 
about a peaceful resolution to the conflict proved to be detrimental to the whole 
demilitarization process. 
Regional instability within the boarders of Rwanda and Burundi has 
contributed to the failure of the demilitarization process. Rwanda has to deal with 
militia groups working within the boarders of Democratic Republic of Congo, 
while Burundi has had to deal with opposition groups working in Uganda. 
The demilitarization process has been complex in both countries, primarily 
because of the nature of the conflict that has caused the civil wars. The conflicts 
have been characterized by ethnic overtones and the struggle for political power. 
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The political atmosphere that exists in the two countries has been a challenge in 
the demilitarization process. There is lack of trust between the parties involved 
' 
and the rebel groups have not been ready to give up their arms out of fear of 
being put at a disadvantage. The application of the model concludes that in order 
for the demilitarization process to be a success, all the parties involved need to 
share the same goals and be sincere in their effort to bring about a peace. 
The outcome of the model when applied to Burundi and Rwanda indicate 
that there are some concepts that are included in the model which are hard to 
establish. The results of the demilitarization process have been affected by the 
political structure of the countries. The results indicate that Burundi has a greater 
chance in a sustainable demilitarization process because the major civil war of 
1994 occurred when the country had already established some form of political 
structure through the help of the United Nations; hence the country had a back 
up government when President Cyprian Ntaryamira died in a plane crash. 
Rwanda, unlike Burundi, went through a genocidal period that destroyed its 
social and cultural structure hence the road to recovery is more of a challenge. 
The nature of leadership in Burundi and Rwanda has made a difference in 
the results of the demilitarization process. The transitional process has been a 
greater success in Burundi because of the willingness of President Buyoya to 
compromise and work towards a peaceful resolution with the rebel groups. 
President Buyoya was willing to participate in the transitional government that 
allowed him to step down in May 2003 and allowed President Domitian 
Ndayizeye to rule in the second phase. On May 1st President Buyoya stepped 
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down and allowed for a smooth transition of power. Rwanda on the other hand 
lacked committed leadership; President Habyarimana, under political pressure 
from his party, was unable to compromise on any deal that relinquished power 
from his party MOR (Republic Democratic Movement). The main rebel group, the 
RPF was more willing, to compromise and willing to accept a peaceful resolution. 
Efforts to establish an effective demilitarization process in Rwanda have also 
been marred by Rwanda's intervention in the civil wars in neighboring 
Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Redefining the role of the military has been a greater success in Burundi 
in the sense that it has helped establish a more diplomatic relationship between 
the rebel groups. There has been no coup attempt since the establishment of the 
transitional government. The government has also been successful in integrating 
former rebel group leaders into the new government. However recent events 
that have occurred within the government sent warning signs that the military 
might not have settled for the back seat. The case of Rwanda is unique in the 
sense that the current government came into power through a military coup that 
sent the former government into exile. The rebels won power; hence convincing 
the army to play a neutral rule, has been more difficult. The current government 
has been accused of protecting its own people from the rule of law. Unlike 
Burundi, the Rwandan government has not gone through a power sharing 
process. The biggest challenge to the current regime will be the up coming 
elections. 
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Improved civil-military relation has been a gradual process in both 
Rwanda and Burundi because of the amount of work that needs to be done in 
order to repair the psychology and emotional damage that was done during the 
genocide period. It is too early to tell the nature of the civil-military relations 
because of the continued fighting that has been occurring for the past few 
months. 
Of all the four aspects of the model, security threats remain the biggest 
and the most unresolved issue in Burundi and Rwanda. The numerous curfews 
that exist in Burundi portray a gloomy picture. The government has failed to 
provide economic and political security for its population. Rwanda still faces the 
threat of rebel groups that are still roaming around the refugee camps. Most of 
the rebel groups are in the neighboring country of Congo. Rwanda has the 
challenge of almost 20,000 soldiers of the former government that remain in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. The rebels might be tempted to form a guerrilla 
army. 59 These rebel groups have the potential to destabilize the demilitarization 
process. 
The most successful aspect of the Arusha model so far has been the role 
that external factors have played in facilitating a peaceful transition to the 
democratic process in Burundi. The international community has been able to 
provide the manpower and monetary resources that have created a more 
peaceful environment despite their failed attempts earlier in the conflict resolution 
process. However their role at times has had mixed blessings, external actors 
----~ 
have been criticized for their inaction in the beginning of the genocide that 
59 Block Robert, "Adelicate merger of warring armies" World Press Review March 1995 
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occurred in Rwanda and Burundi. They also failed to protect refugees from being 
victimized by militia groups working within the camps. 
The lessons leant in the demilitarization of Burundi and Rwanda is that 
positive change in civil-military relationship can only come when the armed 
forces themselves have decided to work towards a positive change. They are the 
one who can aid a successful democratic transition process that would work for 
their own country. One of the good aspects of the conflict resolution process has 
been the participation of regional leaders. The presence of respectable African 
leaders and the Organization of African Union indicates that the regional leaders 
are concerned about the stability and sustainability of the peace process in 
Rwanda and Burundi. 
The model however fails to acknowledge the role of the media. In both 
Rwanda and Burundi, the media was used as a propaganda tool by both the 
rebel groups and the government. Radio played a major role to provoke genocide 
in Rwanda. The "hate radio" such as Radio Tele Libre Mille Collines was used as 
a vehicle for anti-Tutsi propaganda. They have been responsible for fomenting 
ethnic hatred.60 Most of the stations have fervently opposed the peace accords. 
The role of the media should also be addressed in the demilitarization process 
because of its potential in destabilizing the country. The media should be 
encouraged to be apolitical and neutral in its reporting. 
The models emphasis that regional leaders should be part of the 
demilitarization process can have negative ramification when the regional leaders 
have self invested interest on the outcome of the peace process. This can be 
60 BBC News "Country Profile: Rwanda" Tuesday 27 May 2003 
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seen by the support that DRC and Uganda have given to rebel groups in an effort 
to destabilize the peace process in Rwanda and Burundi. 
The main lesson to be learnt in the testing of the Arusha model is that in 
order for demilitarization to be a success, the parties involved should all share 
the same goal, which is to bring stability and peace into their country. Without 
building consensus the process will keep on coming back to the negotiating table 
till all parties are satisfied that they will be included into the decision making 
process. The international Community has learned the importance of having 
coherent and consistent plans in order to effectively make a difference in the 
peace process. 
The demilitarization of Burundi and Rwanda contributes to be an important 
research topic because of their long history with civil wars and the instabilities 
that have been brought in the Great Lake regions. The two countries are also 
reflective of most of the regimes that exist in Africa where the governments are 
going through the transitions to democracy from authoritarian regimes. The topic 
of demilitarization is very relevant in Africa because the African continent has 
been characterized by military coups in almost two-thirds of its states, which 
gained independence after colonial rule. The revolutions that allow for regime 
change have been lead mostly by guerrilla warfare, therefore when 
independence is gained, there is need for the armed forces to put their guns 
down and work toward a democratic transition. Demilitarization of the army is 
important because it encourages healthy civil-military relations and encourages 
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military transparency that allows the transparent civilian audit of the military 
spending. 
The analysis of the four aspects of the model provided a better 
understanding of the complexities that surround transitions in civil-military 
relations. One limitation that the model remains that it does not reflect the need 
for a clear conceptual and theoretical understanding of the root causes of a given 
conflict. The model also neglects to highlight the importance of empowering of 
local actors so that they become the primary architects of the peace process. 
The fact that the demilitarization process in Rwanda and Burundi has not 
been successful does not invalidate the significance and the applicability of the 
model in other countries that are going through the demilitarization process. 
Rwanda and Burundi stand out as unique cases mostly because of the nature of 
the conflict that has occurred. Both countries stand out as being the most 
extreme cases of ethnic cleansing. The genocide has been responsible for the 
death of an estimated 1 .2 million people combined hence the reconciliation and 
peace process has been difficult to implement. The mistrust and insecurity that 
the genocide has caused makes it hard to create an environment that would 
allow for former warring parties to reach an amicable peace process. 
Contribution to Research 
Earlier research on demilitarization has emphasized the importance of setting 
realistic time frames when implementing the demilitarization programs. My thesis 
is similar to past research material on demilitarization because it focuses on a 
case study of two countries and also does a follow up process on the 
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demilitarization process. The thesis has also highlighted some of the findings that 
past research have argued that the process of demilitarization is a slow and 
ambiguous process in the beginning. The results of Arusha model indicate that 
Rwanda and Burundi have a long way to go before results can be seen. My 
thesis supplements on earlier research by concentrating on the role that external 
actor's have played in the demilitarization process. 
Because of the limited research material available on the demilitarization 
process of Rwanda and Burundi my thesis contributes significantly to the 
research material on the topic of demilitarization in Africa. The thesis provides up 
to date research material on the conflict resolution process of the above 
countries. In Summary the demilitarization process has been examined from 
many different perspectives but no recent work has examined the applicability of 
the Arusha demilitarization model. 
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